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Video games have served as a subject around which a litany of highly contentious 
and divisive questions have emerged; many of them revolving around issues of 
gender, violence, addiction and distinctions between work and play.  Given the 
rapidity with which the video game juggernaut has taken up firm residence in North 
American culture, it should come as no surprise that such questions have been quick 
to surface and ferment among academic circles.  Within the span of a decade we 
have moved from an era where the 8-bit gallivanting of a colorful fictional plumber 
reigned as the supreme exemplar of video gameplay, to an age where the ‘grinding’1 
ethos, now so prevalent in massively multiplayer games, is ostensibly more reflective 
of the modes of production that earmark late-capitalism than of traditional notions of 
gameplay (Dibbell, 2006; Castronova, 2005). As such, researchers continue to 
wrestle with the distinctions between ludus and narrative, meanings and effects, work 
and play as they fixate on the artifact of the video game and the cultural 
reverberations that occur as a seeming result and/or correlate of video gameplay.  
However, the discussion here stems from a slightly different paradigm of inquiry by 
asking, ‘what is it that informs and shapes the design of video games?’ 
The above question on its own is one of decisively unmanageable scope, but there 
are a number of lenses and frameworks that one can use to perhaps gain some 
insight on game design practice.  
This research will draw on one framework in particular: that of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
‘language-games’. In short, this research will use Wittgenstein’s language-game 
concept as a lens through which one might examine how design epistemologies (the 
way designers know game design and its conventions) are influenced and reinforced 
by the way designers talk, write, ask questions about and conduct game design.  
This work is a first effort to explore the usefulness of such a framework for purposes 
of understanding more about the manner in which language influences design as well 
as notions of play in current and burgeoning genres. 
To this point, there has been a trickling emergence of philosophical work that deals 
with game design and its practice and it is this author’s intention to contribute to that 
developing field of research.  This paper will employ a Wittgensteinian framework in 
what is hopefully a refreshing approach to examining game design: an approach 
concerned with questions of epistemology that incorporate Wittgenstein’s insights on 
meaning and language. It will be offered here that even the questions asked within 
particular design paradigms2 are based on an epistemology which is intimately tied to 
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language and the ‘grammar’ both spoken and practiced within them (i.e. rules, 
norms, terminology and conventions).   
Wittgenstein often spoke of concepts as ‘tools’ to be used. This paper endeavors to 
utilize his concept in precisely such a manner. 
 
A Brief Look at Language Games 
Recent theorizing around games and notions of play has drawn from a pool of mid-
20th century scholars including such notables as Johann Huizinga, Gregory Bateson, 
Robert Fagan, Roger Caillois and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Through his articulation of 
language and its practice as a type of game, Wittgenstein has been both adopted 
and critiqued3 for purposes of circumscribing what are now commonly held as the 
necessary constituents of games including their systemic nature and the 
acquiescence of their participants to an agreed-upon rule structure: a set of rules 
which Wittgenstein likens to the ‘grammar’ of language (Salen and Zimmerman, 
2001;Suits, 1978; Juul, 2005; Wittgenstein, 1953; Finch, 2001; Brenner, 1999). 
However, the relatively recent consideration of Wittgenstein’s work as a fundament of 
modern game theory is at very least intriguing given that it was Wittgenstein who 
originally turned to games as a model for the dynamics, boundaries and rule-based 
activities of language. Perhaps no less peculiar is this paper’s intent to use 
Wittgenstein’s language-game analogy to help further understand that which informs 
the design of games. 
Understanding language on the model of games, Wittgenstein asserts that games, 
like languages, are rule-based modes of practice that are to be considered part of 
their own “form of life” (1953, p. 11).  This is not to say that ‘form of life’ is a 
designation exclusive to games or even languages, but acknowledging games as 
being embedded within ‘forms of life’ is undoubtedly the first step in using 
Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games as a lens to examine game design praxis. 
 
Forms of Life and the ‘Builder’s Language’ 
Wittgenstein’s detailing of language-games and forms of life supports the idea that a 
language-game itself is not only a culmination of words and utterances, but a 
meaningful activity: a practice that intones a particular organic quality and which is 
ontologically rooted in the dynamism of those participating. It is an activity capable of 
changing, evolving and growing through it very conduct.  
A nebulous and yet fundamental concept, ‘forms of life’4 to Wittgenstein is what 
enables language-games to function as they do: it is the fertile soil that allows the 
growth and development of language-games and acts as the basis from which 
language grows and develops.  It is the underlying foundation for human 
understanding and meaningful exchanges within particular conditions and cultural 
contexts and thus for language-games themselves (Brenner, 1999; Finch, 2001). It is 
the “common behavior of mankind” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 82). 
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our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, 
of old and new houses and of houses with additions from various periods; and 
this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and 
uniform houses […] to imagine language is to imagine a form of life (Wittgenstein, 
1953, p. 8) 
 
Wittgenstein aims to make it clear that the term language-game “is meant to bring 
into prominence that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of 
life”, it is the “whole consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” 
(1953, p. 11; 1953, p. 5).  It is salient to note that language-games are embedded 
within forms of life: that is to say that language-games are something that occur 
within a particular form of life.  Hence, game design may be considered part of the 
forms of life of ‘design’, or ‘commerce’, or ‘cultural production’: the boundaries 
between forms of life, and language-games in particular, are innately blurred over 
one another (Wittgenstein, 1953). Language-games are ‘active’ and are made 
comprehensible by the form of life in which they are nested (Finch, 2001). 
Language-games are thus constantly protean and culturally situated phenomena 
rooted in action, in practice, and this notion is exemplified by Wittgenstein’s allegory 
of the ‘builder’s language’: a series of fictional exchanges in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, which depict two individuals communicating with one 
another in an effort to build a structure from a collection of materials. Builder 
scenarios feature one individual who gives instructions to the other, who through a 
common understanding, must retrieve the appropriate materials and supply them as 
asked.  Wittgenstein makes use of the builders’ language vignettes in order to 
explicitly bring the resulting praxis that stems from language exchange to the fore, 
but he also does so to accentuate in particular how the use of language constructs 
and reinforces meanings within a particular language-game.  To Wittgenstein, 
language moulds and massages the contextual reality shared by its users and it is 
here where the notion of epistemology begins to emerge in Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of language-games. 
 
Knowing and Meaning 
It should be noted that despite this paper’s aims, Wittgenstein in his later work does 
not trouble himself explicitly with the question of epistemology per se, but with the 
question of meanings (this research speaks only to his later, post-Tractatus work5).  
Wittgenstein’s own approach is one that endeavors to remove the veil of metaphysics 
and to do away with the a priori.  Knowledge according to Wittgenstein is rooted in 
the meanings established and expressed contextually through language by those 
who generate and share those meanings (Wittgenstein, 1953; Finch, 2001; Brenner, 
1999). There is no greater transcendental knowledge to possess. Wittgenstein 
believes the word “know” itself defies the shackles of the metaphysical and there can 
be no proof of any given ‘perfect’ knowledge outside of a given set of contextualized 
conventions because such ‘superior’ or transcendental truths cannot be spoken or 
expressed (Wittgenstein, 1953; Finch, 2001). 
To Wittgenstein, issues of meaning precede issues of knowledge: we already ‘know’ 
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because we must ‘know’--to say we ‘know’ is in effect an unnecessary doubling or 
expression of redundancy of that which sense data has already afforded us in every 
day contexts.  H.L. Finch writes that “the certainties of normal human life do not need 
to be further justified and in trusting them, we make no mistakes for they define what 
‘mistakes’ are just as they define what ‘knowing’ and ‘doubting’ are” (2001, p. 113). 
Language becomes the form with which we express and describe our knowledge and 
which subsequently reinforces it. The meanings and descriptions that become 
associated with words through the use of rules consequently shape conventions: the 
shifting rule-based foundations of language-games. It is language and its meanings 
that serve as the supporting pillar of our own epistemologies and as a result, 
language can cement a given epistemology and paradigms within it through the 
adoption and use of its conventions.  Wittgenstein cites the example of philosophy 
itself, noting that the reason we are “still occupied with the same philosophical 
problems as were the Greeks…[is] because our language has remained the same 
and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions” (1980, p. 15).  Wittgenstein 
might argue that this same example could be readily mapped onto what are oft-
referred to as derivative design practices of commercial game designers. However, 
before applying Wittgenstein in any which way to game design, it must be clarified as 
to what we mean by ‘game design’. 
 
Game design: the Building of Semotic Domains 
With a sense of Wittgenstein’s epistemology in tow, outlining what constitutes ‘game 
design’ is crucial. What can we learn by mobilizing Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ 
approach to epistemology as a way to interrogate game design and the intentional 
structuring of games themselves?  At first glance, as with many other processes, 
activities and rituals, game design(s) has its own languages: its own terminologies, 
its own discourses, its own way of addressing phenomena within the field, within a 
genre and within a method of development (i.e. programming tools). The way that 
game design is spoken about in and among designers also often varies between 
different development platforms, different target audiences and of course, different 
designers. There are also the languages of the practice of design: the manipulation 
and exchange of formal language transformed into action, the formation of design 
conventions, the following of rules, the concretization of company procedures, the 
abidance of etiquette, colloquial banter and the development of neologistic 
terminology. All of these things are situated within, even as they situate the very act 
of design: they are the languages and the activities constitutive of the language-
game of ‘game design’. The idea of looking at the way which language shapes the 
way we speak and ask questions within any ‘form of life’ as outlined in Wittgenstein’s 
example of Greek philosophy already demonstrates a glimmer of relevance to game 
design--but what is it that game designers are actually doing? 
 
The Construction of Semiotic Domains 
James Paul Gee, who has earned much academic renown for his book, What Video 
Games Can Teach Us About Learning and Literacy asserts that when one engages 
in the design of a game, one partakes in the construction of a semiotic space which 
requires its own form of literacy to design (Gee, 2001).  Semiotic domains, in Gee’s 
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own phrasing, are “any set of practices that recruits one or more modalities to 
communicate distinctive types of meanings” (2003, p. 18), or in the words of Jason 
Craft, “distinct and embodied contexts, matrices of environmental attributes and, 
crucially, social practices in which signs are given a distinct meaning, and in which a 
person can be literate” (Craft, 2004; Myers, 2003; Rieber, 1996).  In other words, to 
Gee, the design of games can be conceived as the design of semiotic domains. 
Gee outlines two particularly important aspects of semiotic domains. First, there is a 
literacy involved in the participation in a given domain, including the linguistic and 
practical conventions and knowledge of the rules, signs and meanings of those signs 
(Gee, 2001).  Secondly, semiotic domains are designed spaces, and much like 
Wittgenstein, Gee places great emphasis on the practice that has gone into the 
construction of and participation in semiotic domains. 
A semiotic domain then can denote the practice of anything from ‘baseball’ to ‘stamp 
collecting’ to ‘stock market investing’ and although Gee would note that videogames 
give access to their own semiotic domains, these domains have the potential to be 
designed and laden with subject matter that carries with them their own set of 
practices and multiple modalities.  Lloyd Rieber argues that these domains, or 
‘microworlds’ as he terms them can be designed or changed and he cites the 
example of a child’s sandbox where different elements can either be added (such as 
buckets, shovels) or even changed (larger buckets, differently shaped shovels) 
(1996). 
Considering the semiotic domain of Baseball as an example, the in-domain objects 
such as the baseball itself carries with them specific meanings in the context of the 
game and each of them are the subject of multiple modalities (i.e. hitting the ball with 
the bat to score points versus catching the ball off an opponent’s hit before a bounce 
to gain an ‘out’). Thus, the ball carries with it different and potentially nuanced 
meanings depending on the modality assumed in-game—modalities which vary by 
team position, individual in-game role etc..  Baseball is an exemplar of the way 
domain design determines what practices are crucial to functioning within them; 
practices which subsequently allow one to garner a literacy of that domain (Gee, 
2003).  Baseball, is in these ways, not so different from the ‘builder’s language’. 
However, where Gee places his focus on the playing of games, this paper focuses on 
the design of those games. Gee adopts the phrase ‘design grammars’, which refers 
to the rules that organize elements in a system, setting the standards and rules for 
participation and production in that domain (Gee, 2001; Salen and Zimmerman, 
2006). Wittgenstein describes grammar much in the same way theorists frequently 
describe play itself: the rules, degrees of freedom and the loopholes that support 
potentiality and possibility within language (Wittgenstein, 1953; Salen and 
Zimmerman, 2001). Grammar serves as the fundamental groundwork in the creation, 
negotiation and comprehensibility of semiotic domains. 
Thus, conduct within a language-game can be conceived as the crafting and 
constant refining of semiotic domains and their respective grammars. What 
Wittgenstein essentially adds to Gee’s own conceptualization of design is the 
epistemological ramifications of the ‘grammar of design’.  Being thoroughly 
entrenched in the language of a given language-game is to be bathed in the 
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conventions, accepted modalities and ideologies that support a way of knowing and 
taking part in the language-game itself. 
 
The grammar of design 
To this point theorists have found utility in using Wittgenstein to speak to the nature 
of games and play: drawing the parallels between language and games has served 
to delineate certain features about gameplay, rules and consensual meaning 
established between participants in a given game (Salen and Zimmerman, 2001; 
Suits, 1978; Juul, 2005). Wittgenstein however also serves to make concepts such 
as Huizenga’s seemingly rigid ‘magic circle’ more palatable for some by articulating 
that the boundaries around and between language-games (and ‘forms of life’ for that 
matter) are blurred by their very nature (Huizenga, 1950). There of course also exists 
a blurring of lines between ideology and game design paradigms. Brian Sutton-
Smith’s work on the rhetoric of play goes a long way to emphasize and further 
articulate Wittgenstein’s position as it pertains to epistemological discourses of 
persuasion.   
Sutton-Smith does not aspire to unite various definitions of play into one widely 
stretched, canopying theory, but instead articulates the multifarious nature of play by 
outlining a number of rhetorical positions on what ‘play’ actually is, whether rooted in 
paradigms of animal behavior, gambling or otherwise (2001).  Sutton-Smith’s 
divisions of these ‘rhetorics of play’ do not in any way serve to segregate or 
compartmentalize them from one another—after all, there are blurred lines between 
even these language-games.  But this is precisely the central point of his work: play 
is communally conceivable only in a rhetorical manner, with rhetoric being a pivotal 
linguistic device of persuasion, which supports and upholds particular 
epistemologies. As such, rhetoric can perhaps best be considered another way of 
describing what the conventional use of language within a given paradigm already 
manages to surreptitiously accomplish. 
To recapitulate, language-games are an exchange between participants which aid 
and assist in the development of the rules and grammars of a given language-game, 
building up an epistemology which shapes ways of describing things that convey 
similar meanings to all involved parties.  These meanings are embedded in the social 
practices of the language-game participants and become adhered to those social 
practices much in the same way that Sutton-Smith’s rhetoric’s of play become 
communally fastened to a particular way of ‘knowing’ play—a ‘knowing’ which is also 
constructed through linguistic and rhetorical exchange and subsequent praxis by 
scholars in their respective fields. In this way, Sutton-Smith’s notion of rhetoric and 
epistemologies of play and Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning and the 
epistemologies derived from linguistic exchange exhibit a type of ‘family 
resemblance’ to one another, elucidating practice as being intrinsically enmeshed 
with the language exchanged between participants in a particular paradigm of 
inquiry. 
If one looks to speak on the example mentioned at this paper’s onset regarding 
design phenomena such as the ‘grinding’ ethos in current massively multiplayer 
online games, using Wittgenstein, one would need to consider the nature of such a 
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phenomenon starting with investigating the use of the term. Only after this can we 
explore the way language stems from and is translated into action and is 
subsequently held as a convention or norm within massively multiplayer game design 
paradigms. 
 
The Language of ‘Grinding’ and ‘Farming’ 
‘Grinding’ is a derogatory term given to repetitive and work-like tasks in MMO games. 
Grinding manages to be consistently present as a mandatory feature in massively 
multiplayer games despite constant player frustration, boredom and the quest to 
automate such grinding sessions through the use of scripts or macros: tools which 
are often provided by the game’s own designers (not to say that such grinding is not 
enjoyable to some). Conceivably the very coining of the term ‘grinding’, its oft-noted 
exchange, the activity it invokes and the term’s cultural currency epistemologically 
reifies the phenomenon of grinding in the context of MMO game design.  ‘Grinding' 
enters the language-game and subsequently serves to support and reinforce the 
notion of grinding and the paradigm from which it was born. It ossifies into something 
that is now an unquestioned element perpetually incorporated by designers, but also 
something that players now expect to be in a game themselves.  
…it is not only the results but also the method that tells us something about the 
world in which a measurement takes place.  And in this very way the technique of 
use of a word gives us an idea of very general truths about the world in which it is 
used, of truths in fact which are so general that they don’t strike people… 
(Wittgenstein in Brenner, 1999, p. 85) 
Upon entering the language-game of game design for MMOs, grinding aspects 
become treated as a staple, a standard, a known quantity that comes part and parcel 
with the MMO package (Taylor, 2006; Juul 2005; Dibbell, 2006 & Castronova, 2005).   
From both a design and player perspective, grinding in a way now partially defines 
the MMO genre (Dibbell, 2007; Zen of Design, 2007).  Designed instances in which 
players are made to engage with repetitive and creatively pallid activities in a ‘role-
playing’ environment can be found in a series of MMO games and are typically 
variants of “go kill X amount of these animals” or “deliver X item to X person”. This 
model of unvaried routine is an archaic one on which MMO design has been founded 
for several years and yet it remains a design element that is rarely deviated from.6  
Richard Garriott, lead designer of what may be considered the catalytic MMO of the 
last decade in Ultima Online acknowledges that MMO game design “has not changed 
over 10 years” (French, 2007).  He continues, saying that “the fact that people use 
the nomenclature 'grinding' to describe what they do in online games is a bad sign” 
and that it persists in keeping designers cemented in stagnant design paradigms 
(Gamasutra, 2007). Wittgenstein might hasten to argue that Garriott is absolutely 
correct in that assertion, suggesting that ‘grinding’ nomenclature has sedimented 
‘grinding’ within the layers of MMO design conventions. And such could be 
considered the case for a great many genres and their respective terminology. Terms 
such as ‘rails’ and ‘damage per second’ are fastened quite tightly to the language 
used by designers and players alike without care to their meaning or the ostensible 
design shortcomings they quite frequently (mis)represent.  
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But let us pause briefly, momentarily setting Wittgenstein aside and pursuing some 
semblance of economic reasoning to come to grips with the monetary rationale 
behind the implementation of grinding in design.  Such reasoning would at least 
superficially suggest that the means of financial gain through the business models 
adopted by Blizzard7 and others necessitate the need for designing grinding 
instances in their games simply because the increased time-investment made by 
players in such repetitive tasks tend to garner an increasingly steady financial 
commitment from their player contingent (Dibbell, 2006; Castronova, 2005; Zen of 
Design, 2007). However, following that argument, there are other games without 
subscription fees such as Guild Wars, which despite having their profit model based 
on episodic delivery rather than monthly fees, should not have any financial necessity 
for designing ‘grindable’ content into their games--and yet, grinding/farming remains 
evident in their current design model. What makes Guild Wars an even more 
compelling example is the fact that this was not always the case. 
 
Guild Wars and the Grind 
Arenanet, the creators of Guild Wars originally trumpeted their game as one that 
privileged skill over time-invested by a player (Gamezone, 2005; GigaOm, 2006). 
There would be no subscription fee, no farming, there would be no grinding, there 
would be no loot-camping8. In the words of Guild Wars Community Manager, Gaile 
Gray, “Guild Wars is designed to eliminate the grind. […] You won't find ‘10,000 miles 
of virtual 3D terrain’ to wander around in, nor find yourself writing macros and bots to 
chop wood for 10 hours a day while you play Mario Kart” (Gamezone, 2005). 
The original Guild Wars was designed along an arc of progression which allowed a 
player to either explore on one’s own, or to follow the game’s story through 
instanced9 mission completion that whisked the player both narratively and 
geographically through the game’s content. ‘Leveling’ a character in the game was 
designed to be as transparent a process as possible since it was intended that level 
20 be the quickly and naturally accessible maximum cap, making grinding and 
between-level anxiety among players less of a problem (Gamezone, 2005; GigaOm, 
2006). Guild Wars was designed around a single-player styled progression 
infrastructure, which means leveling occurred seamlessly as in-game challenges 
would typically always match the level of a player at any given time if one was 
following the world’s larger narrative10. Grinding for experience was largely 
unnecessary and grinding for gold (the game’s primary currency) only became crucial 
in instances of saving up to buy the game’s rarest armor or perfectly modfied 
weaponry from other players. There was no manner to determine what creature 
would drop the best item nor was there any sort of unique weaponry to desire; 
creatures in high-end areas typically produced randomly generated and randomly 
assigned high-end loot. This meant farming for specific items was minimized and 
‘spawn-camping’11 was eliminated altogether. In other words Guild Wars, in some 
sense, was indeed designed to subvert the grind. 
With the original game released in early 2005, Guild Wars sold exceptionally well and 
was widely considered a triumph. Following this success, Arenanet would ultimately 
release two more episodes or ‘campaigns’ in 2006, but there would be marked 
differences between those and the original game. 
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Factions and Nightfall as the following two campaigns would be named, would 
ultimately begin to incorporate conspicuous instances of grinding into their games. 
For example, both games would only permit progression in certain scenarios after X 
amount of points (‘faction’, ‘sunspear points’ etc.) had been accumulated through 
repeatable quests and creature kills. Such points also became necessary for the 
acquisition of in-game materials and armor.  
Between the original Guild Wars and Factions, ‘green’ unique weapons were 
introduced which could only be obtained by defeating one particular creature in a 
specific instance. These weapons typically possessed the highest weapon 
specifications in-game and the rarest, most ornate designs making them far more 
desirable than previous high-end weaponry and making the ‘farming’ of these items a 
popular activity. 
There was also the introduction of new ‘prestige’ titles that would display on a player-
character how many creatures they had killed12, how many high-end items they had 
found and how many in-game perishable items they had consumed (e.g. alcoholic 
items, which serve little or no gameplay purpose other than to assist in the 
achievement of this particular title track through its consumption)13.  
Within the first week of Factions’s release, the term ‘faction farming’ or ‘’FF’ became 
a staple in the exchanges between players in outposts and towns and soon after 
there emerged formalized player-made guides on how to farm points towards one’s 
title track of choice with the greatest efficiency (Guildwiki, 2007).  
With in-game progression and prestige now tied to grinding and farming, Guild 
Wars’s subsequent iterations (including their most recent expansion pack, ‘Eye of the 
North’) have found themselves succumbing to the time-invested/repetitive task 
completion model of design despite their no-subscription model not requiring such 
time-investments from their players. In fact, a player simply purchasing the game was 
(and still is) enough to live up to the financial expectations of Arenanet from their 
customers in terms of their no-subscription model. So why does the grind become 
inescapable even in a model that does not financially benefit from its presence?  
One might speculate that implementing instances of grinding as a method of in-game 
achievement and progression is a design solution which is a hand-in-glove fit with a 
limited production time frame--and considering that Arenanet made promises of a 
new campaign every 6 months, this self-imposed time limit is certainly worth some 
consideration. After all, designing for the necessity of grinding certainly allows near 
infinite recycling of art assets whether it be textures, levels, models, NPCs and so 
forth. However, the game was sold on the premise that Arenanet’s design directive 
would not reward time-investment over skill. Why regress back towards a paradigm 
which privileges grinding if one’s advertised design mandate was to avoid it 
(Gamezone, 2005; GigaOm, 2006)? 
A language-games approach would suggest that the implementation of particular 
mechanics and design schemas secure in praxis the use of particular terminology 
(e.g. Garriott’s ‘nomenclature’), forming the basis of a reifying rhetoric that justifies 
and upholds design epistemologies and it is this epistemological rhetoric which 
subsequently influences what is construed as ‘play’ by players and designers. And as 
Garriott implies, that rhetoric has been in place for at least a decade as it concerns 
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massively multiplayer online games. 
As such, designers are continually subjugated to the rhetoric of their practice and 
become myopic after consistent engagement with a language-game that reinforces 
and justifies the existence of a phenomenon which may have no truly justifiable 
underpinning, but which carries an established shared meaning among players and 
designers alike (Taylor, 2006; Juul 2005 & Dibbell, 2006).  Players also willingly give 
themselves to this phenomenon and in perhaps a Baudrillardian sense, the 
intertwining language-games of ‘MMO game play’ and ‘game design’ begin to frame 
the grind linguistically as a pure form of play: a simulation of what was once the 
legitimate article. In grinding’s absence, the game then begins ceases to be a ‘game’ 
per se since the role of grinding as the simulacra has effectively replaced the play it 
now represents.  Play loses its meaning in the language-game as ‘the grind’ replaces 
it, or in the words of Baudrillard himself, it is “an implosion of meaning—[and] this is 
where simulation begins” (1983, p. 57). For Wittgenstein, this is where the rules of 
the language-game begin to ‘shift’. The question again is, ‘why’? 
Sutton-Smith’s rhetorical analysis of play, much like Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
construct of language-games, finds utility here as well in describing the nature of 
game design paradigms.  In speaking about rhetorics of play Sutton Smith has the 
following to say: 
In general, each rhetoric has a historical source, a particular function, a distinctive 
ludic form and specialized players and advocates and is the context for specific 
academic disciplines.  In addition, it’s advocates and scholars manifest 
hegemonies both within their own form of play and towards other forms. (Sutton-
Smith, 2001, p. 214) 
[…]scholars also seem to have in common, wittingly or not, the way they 
manipulate these rhetorics to justify their own preoccupations with the different 
play forms. It is not just play that is susceptible to these ideological value systems 
but also that the scholars often need these rhetorics to license their own authority 
over the kinds of play with which they are concerned. (Sutton-Smith, 2001, p. 
215) 
Consider that this notion does not solely apply to the ‘production of knowledge’ that is 
the scholarly field of ‘play’ research within which scholars generate and manipulate 
rhetorics “wittingly or not”, but much like Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games, 
Sutton-Smith’s notion applies to all ‘forms of life’ including that of design. Sutton-
Smith’s ‘hegemonies’ take root in language-games, which rhetorically solidify the 
epistemologies they’re associated with as participants acquiesce to them and their 
associated ideologies. As David Smit asserts, to Wittgenstein, “all interpretations and 
arguments are not primarily a matter of establishing incontrovertible grounds for truth, 
but of persuasion” even if unbeknownst to those who proliferate them (1999, p. 43).  
Without entirely de-politicizing the notion of ‘hegemony’, it should be noted that this 
paper discusses primarily commercial game design, in which case the hegemonic 
aspect of the language-games of design carry with them not only ideological weight, 
but also significant flows of power (Foucault, 1973; 1978). The practice of the 
language-game of game design is one which serves to further solidify itself through 
language and praxis, formulating conventions which become so deeply inscribed 
within language-games participants that they become difficult to deviate from.  The 
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dominant paradigms reign from below, permeating other paradigms (e.g. World of 
Warcraft’s lofty market/user base position among current MMOs).  The more 
participants that invest in the language-game of the dominant paradigm, the more 
that the subsequent encroachment into similar paradigms becomes suffocating and 
as such, emerging epistemologies which often attempt to undergo a shift (such as 
Guild Wars and others) are highly susceptible to being implicitly undermined by the 
conventions already fastened in place through a communal acceptance and 
subsequent justification by that acceptance14. This is what Wittgenstein would refer to 
as the reaching ‘bedrock’: when participants in a language-game (in this case, game 
designers) have exhausted all other justifications for following a particular rule and 
are inclined to say “this is simply what I do” (1953, p. 72). 
For Wittgenstein, we accept particular conventions as normative, but we do not agree 
to the meaning of these conventions because we necessarily understand them. 
“Meaning is not a matter of our assent. Without conventions, we could not 
understand in the first place” (Smit, 1991, p. 36). We tend to understand something 
because we become exposed to a series of contexts, activities and circumstances in 
which we establish the range of permissible meanings in and among a consensus 
(Wittgenstein, 1953; Smit, 1991; Finch 2001). Or to re-invoke Gee, meaning is “not in 
anyone's head, but embedded in the history and social practices of the group” (Gee, 
1999, p. 105). Considering game design, rhetorical hegemonies may be established 
through the use of the language and resulting practice which make up the language-
game of design, but these hegemonies--particularly their maintenance--are not 
necessarily to be considered the product of ill-inspired motivations.  
One of the most significant examples of this might be that of genre, where the 
meanings behind original design conventions often dissipate and metamorphose, but 
their linguistic infrastructures remain sometimes keeping a genre alive in name, but 
not in practice. Such could be considered the case with the Adventure genre, whose 
modern day iterations arguably no longer correspond to the variety of gameplay and 
mechanics the term was originally appended to 20 years ago, but which maintains its 
status as a genre of the same name nonetheless15. The blurring of the genre 
language-games of Role-Playing and Adventure in particular has increased notably 
over years and Wittgenstein might surmise that these ‘genre language-games’ are 
unwittingly being played out without conscious understanding of the shifting 
‘etymological’ underpinnings of the rules by which they operate.16  
How then are we persuaded by the rhetoric of a language-game?  A language-game 
approach would offer that we persuade one another--through agreement and 
concession, participants in a language-game establish, change and support rules as 
they traverse the “shifting landscape” that is the play of the language-game 
(Wittgenstein, 1953; Finch, 2001; Smit; 1999).  We may either thoughtfully or 
capriciously consent to acknowledge or ignore, but we do so in the context of the 
various forms of life that pervade our daily activities whether it be the socio-political 
context of our daily living or the corporate environs of a given workplace. 
Thus, although game design practitioners may be fully literate in the semiotic 
domains that they construct, they have internalized judgments inseparably from a 
mastery of their distinctive discursive competences, and in this way, without any 
explicit argumentation, justification or challenge, choices, decisions or dispositions, 
they have become embedded within their game design praxis. It is not until game 
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design practitioners engage in a communal reflexivity that conscious change can be 
truly made, and Wittgenstein recognizes the potential for conscious change both 
through mindfulness as well as powerful, controlling ideological agendas which can 
take hold through disinterest and apathy (1953).  For Wittgenstein, it would seem that 
an epistemologically dislodging act is possible, but such an act cannot be committed 
privately: it requires a willing constituency who are willing to play a new language-
game entirely or at very least, play the same game with different rules.  This exercise 
of course requires one to become reflexively aware of the language/praxis one has 
already committed to. 
This brings us to what is ultimately both a re-iteration of the above as well this work’s 
culminating point: ‘rhetorical hegemony’ within a language-game is essentially the 
linguistic conventions, both through the exchange of language and the resulting 
practice (the vessels of ideology) that reinforce and cement the design 
epistemologies within which game designers construct semiotic domains: domains 
which intrinsically reflect those epistemologies.  
I would emphasize again that the language-game model does not only apply to what 
is ‘spoken’ during and about game design, but what is ‘done’--language-games 
intone that we speak and then consequently convey understanding and meaning 
through our actions. The manner (language and praxis) in which game design takes 
place is in essence founded on a hegemonic epistemology, constantly ideologically 
permeated, which is unique to a given genre, development protocols, manufactured 
marketing demands among many other things. These things serve as the 
epistemological grammar of design language-games. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research attempts to wield a lens of examination in such a manner as to reveal 
what emerges from its usage. A Wittgensteinian lens helps us see that game design 
is constituted by the ways a discourse community speaks about and engages with its 
distinctive activities: language exchange and practice within a language-game can 
simply never be pried apart from one another as they are organically and intrinsically 
enmeshed with one another. The language of game design, the discourse around 
game design and the praxis of game design are all inseparable, their intersections 
blurred. 
As such, this work has also attempted to call attention to the aforementioned 
statement that ‘epistemological rhetoric subsequently influences what is construed as 
‘play’ (or accepted as ‘play’) by players and designers’. And herein lies a central 
concern and further application of this framework. 
When epistemologies (both design and ludic) are contributed, shared and consented 
to by designers and players in ways that aid in re-shaping communal meanings of 
play (e.g. the semiotic metamorphosis which sees grinding begin to ‘mean’ play 
within game communities), rhetorical hegemonies become expressed through 
gameplay; what I would term, ‘ludic hegemonies’. To rearticulate in Gramscian terms, 
there emerges an ostensible consent by players to accept the implicit ideologies that 
permeate the rules imposed by a game’s design/designers--a consent which sees a 
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reappropriation of seemingly self-evident ‘spontaneous’ grammars (such as 
‘grinding’) as ‘normative’ ones (Gramsci, 1971, Ives, 2004). Niels Helsloot writes: 
Gramsci is in line with Wittgenstein; normativity is not a matter of opinions, but of 
a form of life […] Norms and rules develop within a community, parallel to the 
political aims the community produces, in other words, to its self-definition. 
Normative grammar, and the efforts spent in patiently learning it, discipline 
people [.] (Helsloot, 1989, p. 557) 
Looking at language, design and play through these Gramscian terms politically 
reaffirms and rearticulates Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games and raises 
questions about what terms such as ‘play’ and ‘grinding’ actually mean to players and 
the role language plays in player consent to activities which have earned such 
pejorative nomenclature. Although this paper has focused on the role of language in 
epistemologies of game design, it invariably opens up new inquiries, most 
specifically, ‘what is the role of language in the development of epistemologies of 
play’?  
Potential avenues of inquiry aside, this work has strived to put forth a plausible 
framework regarding game design and language and has hopefully provided at least 
a modicum of potential application, but it is fully realized by this author that the 
application of this framework in greater depth and to more genres/phenomena other 
than grinding and MMOs is clearly necessary for furthering this line of investigation. 
Although there are certainly investigative lenses other than this one, which can lend 
new perspectives on what influences and informs game design. Political economical 
lenses, cultural studies lenses and so on are exceptionally valuable tools for 
revealing new perspectives and allowing us to make more sense of what informs the 
game design process. This paper does not place a set value on any of these lenses 
nor does it suggest the possibility of any unifying discourse among them. Instead this 
paper suggests that a great many perspectives can grant us essentially what our 
senses permit us, as Wittgenstein himself might advocate. It’s not about generating 
‘new’ forms of knowledge, it’s about changing the way we look at what’s already 
there (Wittgenstein, 1953). 
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Notes 
 
1  A massively multiplayer online game colloquialism, grinding refers to the 
constant, repeated engagement (often with one or more already repetitive tasks) 
in the context of such games. These tasks are often partaken in for the 
acquisition of in-game experience points or in-game virtual goods.  Such tasks 
can require a player to do as little as click a mouse while remaining stationary or 
even adopting the use of a specialized script or macro to automate the given 
task such that grinding can be conducted while unattended by the ‘player’.  The 
development and currency of such colloquialisms speak to the very heart of this 
work. 
2  ‘Paradigms’, for purposes of this paper, are those systems of belief and praxis 
nested in language-game participation. Language exchanged in a language-
game and the shared meanings developed between language-game participants 
assist in developing and supporting a paradigm through established 
conventions, which in turn, re-affirm the epistemological rooting of that paradigm 
(Brenner, 1999). 
3  Although Wittgenstein focused on the question which asked ‘what things do 
games have in common’, he never himself believed there to be a formal 
definition of a game.  To Wittgenstein the meaning of ‘game’ could only be 
sought through an inquiry of its use. 
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4  “forms of life’ is a concept which, although remains a core principle of 
Wittgenstein’s later work, was still only mentioned five times in the  entirety of the 
Philosophical Investigations (Finch, 2001). 
5  Wittgenstein’s earlier work was rooted in an ontological position which attempted 
to simplify language to its fundamental elements or  ‘simples’. It was his aim to 
use languages in its clearest and more precise form in order to state 
philosophical ‘facts’ about the world. Wittgenstein would ultimately abandon this 
linguistic/logical atomism and shift his focus from linguistic certainty to issues of 
meaning and the impossibility of transcendental certainty and facts 
(Wittgenstein, 2000). 
6  This is not to say that elements of grinding cannot be located in games other 
than MMOs, but this author would suggest that few other genres are identified so 
clearly by their transparent adoption of this particular design element. 
7  Or more recently known as ‘Activision Blizzard’ 
8  Loot-camping refers to characters waiting around an area for particular loot to 
drop—whether earned by another player or themselves. Also known as ‘ninja-
ing’, such an act is generally considered dishonorable by MMO player 
communities. 
9  Instances refer to spaces in-game separate from the world which are shared by 
only a limited number of players. 
10  There are of course some exceptions, the most prominent of which include those 
players who choose to ‘run’ ahead at a very low level. Such players ‘twink’ or 
‘speed-level’ their characters in the more advanced stages with the help of 
veteran players. 
11  This refers to players waiting in a particular area for a creature to spawn as to 
defeat it and take its loot. Guild Wars’ instancing approach to design eliminated 
this from the outset. 
12  Although not a literal ‘kill-count’, kill-related titles in Guild Wars are reflective of 
how many points were scored through obtainable bounties on particular 
creatures. E.g. 8 Sunspear points for every undead creature killed would count 
toward one’s Sunspear title track. 
13  It should be noted that achieving the ‘Drunkard’ title requires only that a player 
consume in-game alcohol in a town by double clicking on it repeatedly in their 
inventory. It should also be noted that the highest level of the ‘Drunkard’ title 
requires 10000 in-game minutes of character drunkenness, which translates into 
6 days, 22 hours, and 40 minutes of real world time. 
(http://gw.gamewikis.org/wiki/Drunkard) 
14  The position of World of Warcraft in the massively multiplayer online market is an 
ideal example of this. 
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15  Although adventure games still generally adhere to a ‘special-case’ design 
methodology, the focus of such games has arguably moved from an emphasis 
on exploration to an emphasis on ‘enacted’ narrative progression.  
16  Of course we recognize that such a shift has taken place as would be evident in 
any meta-discourse which revolves around issues of genre, but the language-
game leads nowhere without action: there is distinction in the language-game 
between knowing and doing and without the latter, a move in such a game is not 
completed (Brenner, 2001; Finch, 2001; Wittgenstein, 1953). 
